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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 8, 2008, Russian tanks, troops, and aircraft crossed the 
border into South Ossetia, a region in the Republic of Georgia in the 
Caucasus.
1
 On July 19, 2006, the Government of Canada commenced the 
evacuation of approximately 14,000 of its citizens from Lebanon in the 
midst of an armed conflict between Israel and Hizbollah.
2
 These two 
seemingly disparate incidents share one characteristic: they were military 
operations launched by states with the common justification of rendering 
assistance to their citizens in a foreign state. History is replete with 
instances of various forms of military assistance being provided on this 
basis. Frequently, assistance actually provided has been minimal or 
inconsequential in comparison to the other types of military activity 
occurring concurrently.  
The legal justification for military assistance to a state‘s citizens 
outside of its borders is encapsulated in the legal doctrine of the 
―protection of nationals abroad‖ (―doctrine‖).3 It is submitted that the 
protection of nationals abroad involves an intervention by one state, 
represented by its armed forces, into another state for the purpose of 
protecting the lives of its own citizens.
4
 This Article argues that this right 
is generally accepted, subject to the fulfillment of three conditions, as 
expressed by the British jurist Sir Humphrey Waldock: 
(1) an imminent threat of injury to nationals, 
(2) a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to 
protect them and 
 
 
 1. Kevin O‘Flynn & Martin Fletcher, Russia Turns Might of Its War Machine on Rebel 
Neighbour Georgia, LONDON TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at 1.  
 2. Robert Fife, Canadian Evacuation from Lebanon Cost $85M: CTV, CTV NEWS (Sept. 20, 
2006), http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060919/evacuation_tab_060919?s_ 
name. Hizbollah (also known as Hezbollah, which means ―Party of God‖), according to the 
Government of Canada, is a radical Islamic terrorist organization based in Lebanon. The objectives of 
Hizbollah, as derived from its February 16, 1985 political manifesto, include removing all Western 
influences from Lebanon and from the Middle East, as well as destroying the state of Israel and 
liberating all Palestinian territories and Jerusalem from what it sees as Israeli occupation. See 
Currently Listed Entities, PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng 
.aspx#Hizballah (last visited on Apr. 7, 2009).  
 3. Tom Ruys, The “Protection of Nationals” Doctrine Revisited, 13 OXFORD J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 233, 234 (2008). 
 4. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/3
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(3) measures of protection strictly confined to the object of 
protecting them against injury.
5
 
In recent years, a number of states‘ armed forces have removed their 
citizens, and sometimes other states‘ citizens, from states in turmoil. The 
military doctrine related to many of these operations has evolved. Over 
the past decade, it has become more codified and generally referred to as 
the doctrine of Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (―NEO‖).6  
The purpose of this Article is to show that the doctrine of the 
protection of nationals abroad exists within the right of self-defense; with 
contours of the doctrine shaped in recent years by the practice of states in 
their conduct of NEO. This right is limited to the removal of the 
intervening state‘s citizens abroad through the use of force subject to 
necessity and proportionality in order to move the foreign nationals to a 
safe location, Part II discusses the origin of the doctrine of protection of 
nationals abroad and the legal bases that have been used to justify that 
protection. It also considers the impact of the misuse of the doctrine 
throughout its evolution. This explanation includes the claim that the 
protection of nationals abroad does not impugn Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter which prohibits a state‘s use of force against another state and the 
justification that the protection of nationals is an exercise of the right of 
self-defense which complies with a state‘s right of self-defense enshrined 
in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It assesses the doctrine‘s place in self-
defense at customary international law. Furthermore, this Article reviews 
state practice and the debate that has ensued among states and academics 
when states have asserted the doctrine to justify their use of force abroad. 
This Article also assesses the difficulties in determining the legality of the 
doctrine based upon the divided opinion of states. Part III surveys the 
military operational doctrine pertaining to NEO. Part IV assesses the 
recent invocation of the doctrine by the Russian Federation in its conflict 
in South Ossetia. Part V provides an analysis of the how NEOs as state 
practice have acted to limit the extent of protection to nationals abroad. 
Finally, in Part VI this Article concludes with an assessment of the state 
of the doctrine in contemporary international law. 
 
 
 5. Sir Humphrey Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law, 81 RECEUIL DES COURS 455, 467 (1952). 
 6. DEP‘T OF NAT‘L DEFENCE, Joint Doctrine Manual: Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, 
B-GJ-005-307/FP-050 (Ottawa: National Defence, Can., 2003) (discussing Canadian Forces‘ Non-
Combatant Evacuation Operations).  
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II. PROTECTION OF NATIONALS ABROAD DOCTRINE 
Before the U.N. Charter, and particularly prior to the World War I, 
there were comparably few restraints on the waging of wars and use of 
force in international relations.
7
 There was widespread acceptance of the 
right of a state to protect its nationals abroad.
8
 One storied operation was 
the successful expedition led by Sir Robert Napier to rescue a group of 
Englishmen detained by the emperor of Abyssinia (modern day Ethiopia) 
in 1867.
9
 In referring to this operation, British Prime Minister Disraeli 
remarked that the ―standard of St. George was hoisted upon the mountains 
of Rasselas.‖10 This reputed comment is illustrative of the central and 
controversial feature of this doctrine: the collision between the principle 
of protection of nationals and the principle of state sovereignty. Disraeli‘s 
remark raises a question that accompanies a state‘s application of this 
doctrine: what is the true purpose of the intervention? Is it for the purpose 
of protecting a state‘s citizens or is it the pretext for an intervention 
different in kind and longer in duration? 
The doctrine of the protection of nationals has existed in some form 
throughout history. Hugo Grotius, a fifteenth century Dutch jurist and 
early international law scholar, has been quoted as saying: ―Kings, and 
those who are invested with a Power equal to that of Kings, have a Right 
to exact Punishments, not only for Injuries committed against themselves, 
or their Subjects. . . . War is lawful against those who offend nature.‖11  
The origin of the protection of nationals abroad lies in the 
comparatively permissive history of the right of states to use force, which 
 
 
 7. Waldock observes that the prevailing restriction—the justness of the cause—was of little 
practical value by the late nineteenth century, and that the ―recourse to war, the most extreme use of 
force, was not regulated by international law.‖ Waldock, supra note 5, at 457.  
 8. For example, ―[t]he jurists of the nineteenth century universally considered as lawful the use 
of force to protect lives and property of nationals.‖ IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
USE OF FORCE BY STATES 289 (1963). See, e.g., Leslie Green, Rescue at Entebbe: Legal Aspects, 6 
ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 312, 323 (1976). 
 9. See Tom J. Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 AM. J. INT‘L L. 503 (1990). 
 10. HISTORIANS‘ HISTORY OF THE WORLD, XXI, 635 (Henry Smith Williams ed., 1904–05). 
 11. Green, supra note 8, at 323. A discussion of the origins of jus ad bellum is not within the 
scope of this Article. It is acknowledged that caution must be taken in evaluating the current state of 
modern international law based upon established treaty law and ―embodying a form of centralized 
machinery,‖ including the United Nations and the International Court of Justice with natural law 
where ―the rightness of a state‘s action in resorting to self-defence could not be determined otherwise 
than by the state itself, relying on its conscience in the matter.‖ DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–8 (1958). Nonetheless, writers like Bowett recognize natural law as a ―guide 
to the elements of self-defence‖ or as the ―fount of the right to self-defence.‖ YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR 
AGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 179 (4th ed. 2005). As Dinstein writes however, the character of 
modern self-defense must exist within the ―compass of positive international law.‖ Id. at 180.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/3
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existed prior to the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945. Grotius, for 
example, did not suggest that the scope of a response to an injury against a 
subject was explicitly limited by the requirement that the act be necessary 
and proportionate, as does the modern right of self-defense.
12
 Though the 
use of force by states in international relations was comparatively 
unrestrained from antiquity through the First World War, this has changed 
following the Pact of Paris in 1928.
13
 Prior to the treaty, as John Currie 
writes, in the early twentieth century ―international law had been 
evacuated of any content that would hinder resort to force by states.‖14 
This non-aggression treaty between the United States and France was 
eventually ratified by sixty-three states.
15
 It renounced recourse to war as 
―an instrument of national policy.‖16 Its impact was to reverse ―the 
presumption in favour of the right to war.‖17  
Historically, a rescue mission of a state‘s citizens or a monarch‘s 
subjects was a response to injury or insult. It was cloaked in terms of the 
maintenance of national honor and, as such, was used to justify a wide 
range of action, including the use of force. Within this historical origin, 
there is a concept still discussed today: the relationship between a state 
and its citizens abroad. However, it is not as clear whether a comparable 
transgression would allow the impugned state to respond with force 
today.
18
  
 
 
 12. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 120 (2d ed. 2004); Military 
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 122 (June 27) (separate opinion of 
President Singh). 
 13. LESLIE GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 4–10 (3d ed. 2008) 
(quoting Hugo Grotius). Green presents a survey of nineteenth and twentieth century developments in 
the ―criminalizing of war,‖ including the defeat of Napoleon and the Treaty of Versailles. BROWNLIE, 
supra note 8, at 298, suggests that, after the ―Kellogg-Briand Pact [Pact of Paris] and instruments and 
practice related to it, a resort to force, whether a state of war existed or not, otherwise than in defence 
against an attack or by virtue of Article 16 of the Covenant [of the League of Nations], was of 
doubtful legality.‖ Id.  
 14. JOHN CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 619 (2d ed. 2008), at 452–53. 
 15. Id. at 456. 
 16. Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 
L.N.T.S. 57. 
 17. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 289, 92 (1963). 
 18. The question of whether or not an armed attack on a citizen is an attack on the state has 
attracted considerable debate. For example, Derek Bowett cautioned against a reflexive acceptance of 
the identification of the interests of the state and the interests of its nationals: ―in practice it cannot be 
said that a threat to the safety of nationals abroad constitutes a threat to the security of the state.‖ 
BOWETT, supra note 11, at 92–93. He argued for a relative balancing of a state‘s right to protect its 
nationals against another state‘s right to territorial integrity. The U.N. General Assembly sets out 
those acts that qualify as an act of aggression. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. 
No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). Although actions against citizens are not 
enumerated, Article 4 notes that the list is ―not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine 
that other acts constitute aggression.‖ Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Since the adoption of the U.N. Charter, there has been debate as to 
whether the right to protect nationals abroad remains extant. There are a 
number of states which have argued this justification in varying forums in 
the ensuing years: the United Kingdom in relation to the Suez crisis in 
1956;
19
 the United States consistently asserted this right from 1958 until 
1989 during its incursion into Lebanon
20
 and Panama,
21
 respectively; 
Belgium in Congo in 1960 and 1964;
22
 France in Mauritania in 1977;
23
 
and Russia in regard to its conflict with Georgia in 2008.
24
 Similarly, there 
are numerous incidents of states using military assets to mount or attempt 
to mount rescues or evacuations in foreign states, such as France in Gabon 
and Chad in 1990
25
 and reputedly in Colombia in 2003 in an attempt to 
secure the release of dual French citizen and former Colombian 
presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.
26
  
Although its acceptance as a part of international law is contentious, 
the content of the doctrine—set out by Waldock—is generally agreed 
upon.
27
 The terminology has varied. For example, it is referred to as a 
―right to rescue‖28 or as the ―right of forcible protection of nationals 
 
 
 19. U.N. SCOR, 11th Sess., 749th mtg. at 24, U.N. Doc. S/PV.749 (Oct. 30, 1956). 
 20. 39 DEP‘T ST. BULL., 1958, 181, available at http://archive.org/stream/departmentofstat 
391958unit#page/180/mode/2up. President Eisenhower announces the deployment of a contingent of 
U.S. military to ―protect American lives‖ as a part of the justification.  
 21. See George Bush Presidential Library and Museum (Dec. 20, 1989), http://bushlibrary.tamu 
.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1356&year=1989&month=12. 
 22. In regards to Belgium‘s intervention in 1960, see U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 877th mtg. at 18, 
U.N. Doc. S/PV.877 (July 20, 1960). The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak 
outlined the legal basis for the 1964 intervention to the Chamber of Representatives; it was 
humanitarian for the evacuation of European and American population, Alain Gerard, L’Operation 
Stanleyville-Paulis Devant le Parlement Belge et les Nations Unis, 3 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 244 (1967). 
 23. The Permanent Representative to the United Nations of France wrote to the President of the 
Security Council explaining the basis for its intervention: ―in the face of the persistent threats directed 
against our compatriots in undisputed Mauritanian territory . . . it is the duty of the French 
Government, as it would be the duty of any Government with respect to its nationals abroad, to 
provide protection for them.‖ Permanent Rep. of France to the U.N., Letter dated Dec. 22, 1977 from 
the Permanent Rep. of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/12503 (Dec. 22, 1977). 
 24. See Transcript of the Meeting with the Participants in the International Club Valdai, 
PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA (Sept. 12, 2008), http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/09/12/1644_ 
type82912type8291 7type84779_206409.shtml. 
 25. Richard B. Lillich, Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 77 INT‘L L. 
STUD. 103–05 (2002). 
 26. Philip Jacobson, Failed Rescue Leaves French Red-Faced, THE AGE (Aug. 4, 2003), http:// 
www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/08/03/1059849276062.html. 
 27. For example, scholar Ian Brownlie observes that the attempt to provide a basis for the 
doctrine in modern law in self-defense is based upon the conditions set out by Waldock. BROWNLIE, 
supra note 8, at 199; TOM RUYS, ARMED ATTACK AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER 213 (2010). 
 28. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Defending Nationals Abroad: Assessing the Lawfulness of Forcible 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/3
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abroad.‖29 More controversially, it has been referred to as ―humanitarian 
intervention.‖30 Humanitarian intervention, which gained prominence in 
the Kosovo air campaign, is a different doctrine, notwithstanding that a 
humanitarian element may be present within the doctrine of protection of 
nationals. Whereas humanitarian intervention usually refers to the 
protection of human rights of individuals in another state‘s territory, the 
doctrine of the protection of nationals relates to a state‘s protection of its 
citizens beyond its borders.
31
  
A. Legal Doctrine of the Protection of Nationals Abroad 
Writing in regard to episodes of nineteenth and early twentieth century 
intervention, Brownlie made the following comments, which remain 
applicable to many incidents of armed intervention in the twentieth 
century: ―[w]hat is characteristic of these and other examples of 
 
 
Hostage Rescues, 48 VA. J. INT‘L L. 451, 459 (2008). 
 29. Lillich, supra note 25, at xxvii, 1. 
 30. Nikolai Krylov, Humanitarian Intervention: Pros and Cons, 17 LOY. L.A. INT‘L & COMP. L. 
REV. 365, 367 (1995); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 
1620, 1628–29 (1984) (placing the protection of nationals within the ambit of ―humanitarian 
intervention‖). 
 31. For example, Nikolai Krylov suggested that ―[s]ometimes humanitarian intervention is 
enlarged, including the use of armed force either for protection of nationals abroad or with respect to 
rescuing nationals.‖ Nikolai Krylov, Humanitarian Intervention: Pros and Cons, 17 LOY. L.A. INT‘L 
& COMP. L. REV. 365, 367 (1995). It is suggested that this fails to differentiate between two related 
but distinct doctrines, particularly in the aftermath of the defining instance of humanitarian 
intervention—the NATO air campaign in Kosovo. John Currie, NATO’s Humanitarian Intervention in 
Kosovo: Making or Breaking International Law?, 36 CAN. Y.B. INT‘L L. 303 (1998) (discussing 
humanitarian intervention, particularly its post-U.N. Charter evolution). Subsequent international 
response to the Kosovo campaign led to the codification of the doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention 
in the Responsibility to Protect World Summit Outcome Document by the U.N. General Assembly, 
which states:  
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility 
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.  
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
G.A. Res. 60/L.1, ¶ 138–39, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1, at 31 (Sept. 15, 2005). 
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intervention is that protection of lives and property of nationals is one of 
several justifications offered and the justifications are framed so widely 
that their legal content is obscured by general considerations of national 
policy.‖32  
There are generally two legal bases cited for the protection of 
nationals:  
(i) it does not constitute a use of force prohibited by Article 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter; or 
(ii) it is a legitimate exercise of a state‘s right of self-defense.33  
The following sections explore both of these legal bases. 
1. An Exception to the Prohibition on the Use of Force Under 
Article 2(4) 
The legal restrictions on the use of force in international relations grew 
markedly throughout the twentieth century, culminating in the treaty 
establishing the U.N.
34
 The provision encapsulating the established 
prohibition of the use of force in international relations is Article 2(4) of 
the U.N. Charter. It states that ―[a]ll Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.‖35 
The fact that this is both customary law
36
 and a jus cogens norm is 
generally accepted.
37
 The International Court of Justice (―ICJ‖) 
considered the restraints on the use of force in international relations in 
 
 
 32. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 290. He refers, amongst other instances, to the U.S. engagement 
in Cuba in 1898 and China in 1900. Id. 
 33. See Rex J. Zedalis, Protection of Nationals Abroad: Is Consent the Basis of Legal 
Obligation?, 25 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 209, 221 (1990) (providing a survey of this basis); see also Paul 
Stoffa, Special Forces, Counterterrorism, and the Law of Armed Conflict, 18 STUD. CONFLICT & 
TERRORISM 47, 54 (1995); GREEN, supra note 13, at 11.  
 34. Waldock refers to it as the ―cornerstone of peace.‖ Waldock, supra note 5, at 492; see also 
BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 112.  
 35. U.N. Charter, art. 2(4). 
 36. JOHN CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 619 (2d ed. 2008), supra note 14, defines this 
as ―a source of international law predicated upon general state practice accompanied by the conviction 
that such practice is required as a matter of international law. See the North Sea Continental Shelf 
(F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), for a review of the components of customary 
international law. ―[I]t is based upon the work done in this field by international legal bodies, State 
practice . . . the claim being that these various factors have cumulatively evidenced or been creative of 
the opinio juris necessitatis, requisite for the formation of new rules of customary international law.‖ 
Id. at 29.  
 37. GRAY, supra note 12, at 29. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/3
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the Corfu Channel case, and in response to British claims that they used 
forcible intervention to gather evidence for the tribunal, the ICJ stated: 
The Court can not accept such a line of defence. The Court can 
only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of 
a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious 
abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in 
international organization, find a place in international law.
38
  
The extent of this prohibition has been the subject of debate. It is beyond 
the scope of this Article to review the nature and scope of Article 2(4) in 
detail. However, those who support a broad restriction generally start with 
a plain reading of the provision itself coupled with a contextual review of 
the provision within the scheme of the U.N. Charter.
39
 For instance, 
Article 2(4) does not merely prohibit the use but also the threat of the use 
of force. Furthermore, the Charter obligates members to settle 
international disputes ―by peaceful means‖40 and it contains controlling 
mechanisms for when force may be authorized.
41
 The combination of the 
prohibition with pacific obligations strictly regulates the use of force by 
states in international relations.  
Subsequent developments in international law have reinforced the 
prohibition on the use of force in international relations. The Declaration 
Concerning Friendly Relations
42
 prohibits intervention in other states and 
has been accepted as customary international law by the ICJ.
43
 This has 
further restricted legal recourse to the use of force.
44
 
 
 
 38. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. & Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9). 
 39. See DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 87–88. 
 40. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3. 
 41. U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51. In addition, the customary right of self-defense and the right for a 
state to consent to the use of force by a foreign state in its territory exists as distinct legal bases for the 
use of force.  
 42. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). 
 43. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 191 (June 27). 
 44. Oscar Schachter writes: 
article 2(4) has a reasonably clear core meaning. That core meaning has been spelled out in 
interpretive documents such as the Declaration of Principles of International Law, adopted 
unanimously by the General Assembly in 1970. The International Court and the writings of 
scholars reflect the wide area of agreement on its meaning. It is therefore unwarranted to 
suggest that article 2(4) lacks the determinate content necessary to enable it to function as a 
legal rule of restraint.  
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1633 (1984). 
Zedalis explains the link: 
The language of elaboration contained in the Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations is 
attached to principle number three [of the Declaration], which imposes a duty not to 
intervene in ―matters within domestic jurisdiction‖ of another state. . . . Maltreatment of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As Article 2(4) of this declaration relates to the doctrine of the 
protection of nationals, the reference to ―territorial integrity or political 
independence‖ is central. In general, these words are cited as the basis for 
the view that the application of the doctrine to protect, and the exercise of 
the underlying state right, does not impugn this provision. Leslie Green 
suggests that where a use of force does not violate those aspects of a 
state‘s sovereignty, it may not breach this prohibition.45 According to this 
view, the use of force is not prohibited because it is not the intention of 
the intervening state to usurp the sovereign government or annex its 
territory; it is instead focused on the rescue of its citizens in accordance 
with the doctrine of protection of nationals abroad.
46
  
A contrary position has been put forward by Brownlie in response to 
the suggestion that this wording effectively places a further condition on 
the application of the prohibition as ―the conclusion warranted by the 
travaux prepatoires is that [Art. 2(4)] was not intended to be restrictive but 
. . . to give specific guarantees to small states and that it cannot be 
interpreted as having a qualifying effect.‖47 
Perhaps the most well-known modern example of the application of 
the doctrine of the protection of nationals involves the actions of the Israel 
Defense Force (―IDF‖) in Entebbe, Uganda. It is also a reference point to 
consider the question of whether an intervention for the protection of a 
state‘s nationals violates the ―territorial integrity‖ of a state for the 
purposes of Article 2(4).  
The Israeli operation arose from the hijacking of an Air France 
passenger jet, originating in Tel Aviv, by an assortment of Arab and 
European nationals en route to Paris from Athens.
48
 The flight was 
subsequently diverted to Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where all 
passengers, with the exception of those carrying Israeli passports, were 
released.
49
 After a week of negotiations for the release and return of the 
Israeli captives that included, among others, representatives from the 
governments of Israel and Uganda, Israel launched a military intervention 
 
 
foreign nationals threatens international peace and creates an international problem, thereby 
causing the situation to fall beyond the domestic jurisdiction of the maltreating state. . . . 
[M]altreatment of foreign nationals should not result in the sanction of unilateral action 
prohibited by article 2(4), but rather trigger the powers of the United Nations to take 
corrective action. 
Zedalis, supra note 33, at 231. 
 45. GREEN, supra note 13, at 9. 
 46. Zedalis, supra note 33, at 221. 
 47. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 267; see also Doc. 442, III/3/20, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 342–46.  
 48. WILLIAM STEVENSON, 90 MINUTES AT ENTEBBE 3–5 (1976). 
 49. MARTIN GILBERT, ISRAEL: A HISTORY 471 (2001). 
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into Uganda with aircraft belonging to the Israeli Air Force and 
commandos.
50
 The duration of the military operation Thunderbolt on 
Ugandan soil lasted approximately ninety minutes.
51
 It resulted in the 
rescue and removal of the remaining hostages (except for one taken earlier 
to a local hospital) and the deaths of one IDF member, several members 
of the Ugandan military, and a number of the hostage takers.
52
 
The Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, Chaim Herzog, adopting 
the writing of New Zealand legal scholar D.P. O‘Connell, asserted that 
Article 2(4) is not violated if the state intervening is doing so for the 
―protection of a state‘s own integrity and its nationals‘ vital interests, 
when the machinery envisaged by the United Nations Charter is 
ineffective in the situation.‖53  
In contrast, the United States argued that while ―normally such a 
breach would be impermissible under the [Charter],‖ it was acceptable in 
the context of the protection of nationals threatened with injury.
54
 France 
addressed the link between intent and sovereignty, suggesting that if there 
was a violation, it was not done to infringe the territorial integrity or the 
independence of Uganda, but rather to ―save endangered human lives.‖55 
While a number of states at the Security Council adopted ambiguous 
positions on the doctrine of the right to protect nationals per se, the 
proposition that the Israeli operation did not violate Article 2(4) was met 
with wide disagreement.
56
 For example, Sweden was ―unable to reconcile 
the Israeli action with the strict rules of the Charter‖ but did ―not find it 
possible to join in condemnation in this case.‖57  
 
 
 50. STEVENSON, supra note 48, at 103; GILBERT, supra note 49, at 471. 
 51. STEVENSON, supra note 48, at vii. 
 52. See GILBERT, supra note 49, at 471–73, for a brief description of the subject, and 
STEVENSON, supra note 48, at 99–125, for a thorough review of the event, specifically for an account 
of the execution of the operation. 
 53. U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1939th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. Sp/PV.1939 (July 9, 1976). 
 54. Schachter, supra note 44, at 1630–31. 
 55. U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1943d mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. Sp/PV.1943 (1976). 
 56. GRAY, supra note 12, at 31. 
 57. U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1940th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. Sp/PV.1940 (1976). Similarly, 
Mauritius deemed the Israeli action aggression, id. para. 70, Guyana said this was a breach of Article 
2(4), id. paras. 80–81, and Yugoslavia called the raid a ―flagrant violation of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of an independent and non-aligned country.‖ U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1941st mtg. 
at 65, U.N. Doc. Sp/PV.1941 (1976). The Soviet Union stated that it ―fully shares the views expressed 
by 48 African countries in the unanimously adopted resolution of the Conference of Heads of State 
and Government of the Organization of African Unity, which roundly condemns Israel‘s aggression 
against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Uganda.‖ Id. at 155. The United Kingdom seemed 
to acknowledge a breach of Article 2(4), but noted that there was a state right and ―perhaps [a] duty‖ 
to protect its people. U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1940th mtg. at 107, U.N. Doc. Sp/PV.1940 (1976).  
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While there is some debate among academics as to the existence of an 
exception to the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) for the 
exercise of a state‘s right to protect its nationals abroad, Oscar Schachter 
has written in support of this,
58
 it is limited.
59
 It is submitted that the 
preponderance of opinion, and the response of other states to Israel‘s 
invocation of this exception, demonstrates that Article 2(4) does not 
permit the use of force for the purpose of the protection of nationals.  
2. Article 51: Self-Defense 
Unlike Article 2(4), which does not provide viable justification for the 
protection of nationals, Article 51 is a viable justification. Indeed, the 
protection of nationals abroad generally relies on claims of self-defense.  
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states that nothing ―shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
 
 
 58. The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1628 (1984) 
(―Humanitarian Intervention as a ‗broad exception to the prohibition in article 2(4).‖). He writes that 
in the case of the protection of nationals this contains three elements ―(1) an emergency need to save 
lives; (2) legitimate self-defense; and (3) non-derogation of territorial integrity or political 
independence of the state in whose territory the action occurred.‖ Id. at 1629. It is the third strand of 
his argument that seeks to justify the use of force to protect nationals abroad by expressly excluding it, 
through his use of the qualifying term ―non-derogation‖ from Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, the 
language he references in his position.  
 59. More common are those scholars who have relied upon the ICJ decision in Corfu Channel 
case (U.K. & Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 34 (Apr. 9), which rejected U.K. claims that their use of force 
inside Albanian waters to gather evidence did not threaten Albanian ―territorial integrity, nor . . . 
political independence‖ for the interpretation that Article 2(4) should not be read restrictively 
permitting uses of force, subject to its ―qualifying language.‖ See BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 266–67; 
CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 33 (3d ed. 2008) notes that the 
―overwhelming majority of states speaking in the [U.N. Security Council] debate [on Entebbe] 
regarded Israel‘s action as a breach of Article 2(4). Those who did not condemn Israel did not 
expressly defend the legality of its action in terms of a narrow interpretation of Article 2(4).‖ Id. A 
similar assessment is made by NOAM LUBELL, EXTRA-TERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-
STATE ACTORS 27 (2010). Lubell concludes that  
while there are ongoing attempts to find interpretations to legitimize humanitarian 
intervention, the prevalent view does not seem currently to support interpreting Article 2(4) 
of the Charter in such a way that unilateral (without Security Council authorization) 
humanitarian intervention would be a legitimate exception to the ban on the use of force. 
Id. at 29. More generally, JOHN CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 470 (2d ed. 2008), reviews the 
academic debate surrounding the interpretation of Article 2(4), specifically the existence, if any, of 
internal limitations on the scope of the prohibition on the use of force it contains. He considers the 
views of the ―maximalists‖ as those who argue the prohibition should be read broadly and the 
―minimalists‖ as those who suggest that the ―additional language found in Article 2(4) plays an 
important role in limiting its scope.‖ Id. at 470–71. While not addressing the doctrine of the protection 
of nationals specifically, he observes that it would be ―difficult to conclude that Article 2(4) 
prohibition is limited by a right of states to use force unilaterally in the name of promoting or 
encouraging respect for human rights.‖ Id. at 483.  
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occurs against a Member of the United Nations.‖60 When considering this 
legal justification, it is necessary to discern whether the inherent right of 
self-defense includes the protection of nationals. The content of the 
inherent right of self-defense, as intended during the course of negotiating 
the U.N. Charter, was to mirror the customary right of self-defense that 
existed in international law at the time of the U.N. Charter‘s adoption.61 
The ICJ affirmed the relationship between the U.N. Charter provision on 
self-defense and its customary antecedent:  
Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there 
is a ―natural‖ or ―inherent‖ right of self-defence, and it is hard to 
see how this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its 
present content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter. 
Moreover the Charter, having recognized the existence of this right, 
does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content.
62
 
3. The Doctrine of the Protection of Nationals Abroad as Self-Defense 
in Customary International Law  
Customary international law may be defined ―as a source of 
international law predicated upon general state practice accompanied by 
the conviction that such practice is required as a matter of international 
law.‖63 The first line of inquiry is whether the doctrine of the protection of 
nationals abroad, as it existed at the time of the adoption of the U.N. 
Charter, was found in the right of self-defense in customary international 
law. While the existence of a right to protect nationals was not 
controversial at the time, the precise legal basis for it was less certain. 
This debate includes proponents of an expansive view of self-defense: that 
the right to protect nationals, then and now, is contained in the inherent 
right of self-defense as it existed in customary international law at the 
time the U.N. Charter came into force. Therefore it is captured within the 
ambit of Article 51. On the other hand, it can be argued that the doctrine 
of the protection of nationals was not an example of self-defense and 
instead was a separate unjustified use of force or part of a former doctrine 
 
 
 60. U.N. Charter, art. 51. 
 61. Doc.885, I/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs 400 (1945); Zedalis, supra note 33, at 238. 
 62. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 122, 94 (June 27) 
(separate opinion of President Singh).  
 63. JOHN CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 36, at 578; see also North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. 
The Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. Rep 3, at 29. 
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of self-help, in which case the existence of this right after the adoption of 
the U.N. Charter is unlikely. 
The protection of nationals abroad doctrine has origins in a somewhat 
murky well of legal justification. Lillich traces the development of 
justification for the modern protection of nationals doctrine to the 
―classical publicists‖ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.64 
Grotius held that a sovereign‘s concern and responsibility for his subjects 
gave rise to a ―certain necessity,‖ which Lillich deemed a sovereign right 
of self-help to justify the use of force to protect them.
65
 Subsequent 
writers, including Wolff and Vattel, wrote of the state‘s obligation to 
defend its nationals, a right Lillich traced to a state‘s right of self-defense 
or self-help.
66
  
The distinctions between the doctrine of self-defense and the doctrines 
of self-help, self-preservation, and necessity, as the doctrines existed in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, are not clear. Bowett 
suggests that it was doubtful that self-preservation and necessity could 
have ―any meaning as a legal concept apart from a generic term for self-
defence, self-help and necessity.‖67 Brownlie writes that ―self-
preservation is regarded as identical with that of self-defence‖ in the 
period before the First World War and that it was the ―greatest obstacle to 
adequate legal regulation of the use of force [because it was] too vague 
and susceptible to selfish interpretation to provide a basis for a legal 
regime.‖68 Furthermore, in his view the predominant reliance upon it by 
writers and states meant that it obscured the ―juridical value of a doctrine 
of self-help.‖69 Bowett distinguished self-help from self-defense as 
follows:  
[T]he right of self-defence operates to protect essential rights from 
irreparable harm in circumstances in which alternative means of 
protection are unavailable; its function is to preserve the legal status 
quo, and not to take on a remedial or repressive character in order 
to enforce legal rights. This, the latter function, is the function of 
self-help, and, in a legal system which by its degree of 
centralization confines the task of law enforcement to collective 
organs, the positive, remedial role of self-help may well be taken 
 
 
 64. Lillich, supra note 25, at 1. 
 65. Id. at 2. 
 66. Id. at 2–4. 
 67. BOWETT, supra note 11, at 10 
 68. BROWNLIE, supra note 8 at 46–48. 
 69. Id. at 48. 
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from the individual states, leaving to them only the protective right 
of self-defence. This, it is believed, is the position which the United 
Nations Charter intended to achieve.
70
 
Interestingly, even Brownlie concedes that after the Pact of Paris, which 
he views as having narrowed the right of ―legitimate self-defence‖ to the 
―military necessity of meeting force with force,‖ there was a ―certain 
ambiguity in the attitude of League organs toward the Japanese plea of 
legitimate defence for the purpose of protecting lives and property of 
nationals: it is not clear whether the facts or the law told against Japan.‖71 
Brownlie notes that in the beginning of Japan‘s conflict with China, the 
Council of the League of Nations was ―equivocal‖ in response to 
assertions by Japan that it was intervening to protect its nationals.
72
 The 
resolution of the Council of the League of Nations noted the Japanese 
assertion that it would withdraw its troops ―in proportion as the safety of 
the lives of and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured.‖73 
The Chinese expressed satisfaction with the resolution and, by reasonable 
inference, the proposition that the protection of Japanese nationals was 
linked to an orderly withdrawal of Japanese forces.
74
 It was only after it 
was clear that there was no factual basis to the assertion that Japan was 
intervening to protect its nationals that condemnation of its actions was 
made by the United States and the Assembly of the League.
75
 
The terminology and justifications used in support of instances of the 
protection of nationals have not always been clear. However, the 
challenges in separating the concepts of self-defense, self-preservation, 
and self-help from pre-U.N. Charter international law, as seen in the 
writings of Bowett and Brownlie, is not limited to assessing the basis for 
the doctrine of the protection of nationals.
76
 These are criticisms 
applicable to the development of the concept of self-defense itself. Both 
positions have supporters; among the early respected international 
 
 
 70. BOWETT, supra note 11, at 11. 
 71. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 242. 
 72. Id. at 294. 
 73. League of Nations, 7th mtg., Official Journal 2307 (Dec. 1931); see also BROWNLIE, supra 
note 8, at 295. 
 74. In the debate prior to the passage of the Council Resolution the Chinese representative  
noted with satisfaction that, by the terms of the proposed resolution, the Council was 
conscious of its responsibility for helping both parties to secure the complete and prompt 
withdrawal of the armed forces of Japan and the full re-establishment of the status quo ante, 
and would remain in session until that responsibility was fully discharged. 
 League of Nations, 7th mtg., Official Journal 2308 (Dec 1931). 
 75. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 294. 
 76. BOWETT, supra note 11; BROWNLIE, supra note 8. 
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scholars who characterized the doctrine as a component of self-defense 
are Waldock and Bowett.
77
 Brownlie is skeptical of this view. 
Waldock, writing about the Corfu Channel case,
78
 acknowledged that 
the Court interpreted the right of self-defense as being narrow.
79
 However, 
he said that the ―long established right‖ of intervention for the protection 
of nationals remained.
80
 The right was restricted in his view; it would be 
for the ―sole purpose of securing the safe removal of nationals.‖81  
Similarly, Bowett wrote,―[t]he right of the state to intervene by the use 
or threat of force for the protection of its nationals suffering injuries 
within the territory of another state is generally admitted, both in the 
writings of jurists and in practice of states.‖82 
In contrast, Brownlie considered the classic definition of self-defense 
arising from the Caroline incident,
83
 and Waldock‘s conditions for 
intervention suggested that they were ―not to be found in the state practice 
or works of jurists of the nineteenth century. States merely referenced the 
need to protect citizens and their interests.‖84  
Prior to the enactment of the U.N. Charter, and even the Kellogg-
Briand Pact,
85
 discussions of a state‘s right of self-defense, particularly in 
instances where states used force in support of nationals abroad, was often 
 
 
 77. Waldock, supra note 5, at 467; BOWETT, supra note 11, at 87. 
 78. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. & Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9); Waldock, supra note 5. 
 79. Waldock, supra note 5, at 502. 
 80. Id. at 503. 
 81. Id. at 502–03. 
 82. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 87. 
 83. The discussion flowing from the Caroline case refers to the communication between the 
United States and Great Britain following the British sinking of the U.S. ship the Caroline on Navy 
Island, a U.S. territory in the Niagara River, on the basis that the ship was being used in support of the 
rebel faction led by MacKenzie during the Rebellion in Upper Canada on December 29, 1837. See 2 
MOORE DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (1906); see also Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard, The 
Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self-Defence in Contemporary International Law, 1 MISKOLC J. INT‘L L. 
104, 106–12 (2004). By correspondence on July 27, 1842, Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote to 
U.K. Special Minister Ashburton about the concept of self-defense: ―necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation . . . did nothing 
unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by 
that necessity, and kept clearly within it.‖ Id. at 104–20. While oft cited as the touchstone for the 
discussion of the modern position on self-defense, the Caroline case is not without its criticisms, 
including that it more properly relates to the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense or that it is an 
example of the sort of ―self-help‖ which belongs to a former period that pre-dates the emergence of 
twentieth century restrictions on the use of force. See GRAY, supra note 12, at 121.  
 84. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 299.  
 85. Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 
L.N.T.S. 57. This is also referred to as the Pact of Paris. It is named for its chief negotiators—the U.S. 
Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister, respectively. It sought to ―condemn recourse to 
war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy 
in their relations with one another.‖ GREEN, supra note 13. 
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bundled with concepts of self-help and self-preservation. This raises some 
issues. Did the customary right of self-defense, which existed in a 
comparatively unregulated international legal environment prior to World 
War I, include the right to protect nationals abroad? Is it possible to trace 
the existence of self-defense in situations where states deployed their 
forces to protect their nationals abroad? 
The word ―inherent‖ in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reflects the 
existence of a scope in which force may be used by a state, 
notwithstanding the prohibitive nature of the U.N. Charter as a whole, 
anchored in the broad prohibition on the use of force found in Article 2(4) 
of the U.N. Charter.
86
 Even Ian Brownlie, who doubts the existence of the 
right to protect nationals abroad under modern law,
87
 acknowledges that 
the right to protect nationals abroad, argued in terms of self-defense, was 
not rejected when considered by the League of Nations prior to World 
War II.
88
 The excesses of historical episodes of ―gunboat diplomacy‖ 
should not obscure the relationship between a state and its nationals and 
the enduring interests states have in protecting their nationals abroad. 
Bowett writes that under international law, a right to protect nationals 
abroad crystallizes when a foreign state has breached its duty to safeguard 
the lives within its territory from infringement.
89
 Not all infringements 
allow the use of force—only those which carry the ―immediate threat of 
irreparable injury to the life‖ of nationals.90 He recounts that military 
interventions by the United States in Cuba in 1898 and Haiti in 1915 were 
justified in part by the imminent danger to U.S. citizens.
91
 This was a 
defensive measure, although he acknowledges the questionable propriety 
of other acts committed by the United States when U.S. forces arrived in 
 
 
 86. See JOHN CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 484 (2d ed. 2008) (―[T]he very broad scope 
of the Article 2(4) prohibition and its customary analogue must be understood in the other U.N. 
Charter provisions that qualify it . . . there are essentially two in number: 1) [Security Council 
authorization under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter]; and 2) even in the absence of Security Council 
authorization, states may use armed force, individually or collectively, in self-defence.‖). 
 87. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 301. 
 88. Id. at 242. 
 89. BOWETT, supra note 11, at 89. 
 90. Id. His formulation included property; however, he subsequently writes that the protection of 
property by military force ―can rarely, if at all, be extended to property rights of nationals abroad.‖ Id. 
at 101. 
 91. President McKinley addressed Congress on the intervention in Cuba and provided a number 
of different justifications including: ―We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them the protection 
and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to 
terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.‖ Message from the President to the 
Congress, [1898] Foreign rel. U.S. 750, 757–58 (1901), http://www.academicamerican.com/progressive/ 
worldpower/docs/McKCuba.htm.  
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Haiti. He also excludes reprisals in the case of a number of European 
states in the eighteenth century from falling within the concept of self-
defense.
92
  
There are challenges in isolating the exercise of a right of self-defense 
from among other objectives where states acted forcibly to protect their 
nationals. Nonetheless, the belief in a right of self-defense has motivated 
states to intervene, at least in part. Therefore, it is suggested that the 
justification for forcible or military intervention to protect nationals 
abroad has roots in a right of self-defense.  
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ recognized that there is a customary 
nature to the right of states to use force in self-defense, and that the U.N. 
Charter does not regulate ―all aspects of its content.‖93 It was further noted 
during negotiations for the U.N. Charter that ―self-defense remains 
admitted and unimpaired.‖94 As has been shown in its interventions in 
Cuba and Haiti, the United States relied upon this right. The Council of 
the League of Nations‘ response to Japan‘s invocation of the doctrine in 
their forcible intervention in China and for China‘s condonement of the 
link between the withdrawal of Japanese troops and the protection of its 
nationals, further indicates the right to forcibly protect nationals abroad 
was in accordance with established order. It is submitted that the inference 
to be drawn is that such armed intervention to protect a state‘s nationals 
was itself recognized as part of a state‘s right of self-defense under the 
customary law in the time before the enactment of the Charter.  
4. State Practice Until the End of the Cold War 
Since the adoption of the U.N. Charter, state practice of the doctrine of 
the protection of nationals has defied facile description. It is difficult to 
discern state practice in regards to the existence of the doctrine in 
international law to protect nationals abroad. There have been a number of 
incidents, described above, where the U.N. Security Council proposed 
resolutions addressing situations where the doctrine has been invoked—
notably when the United States and Israel have been involved.
95
 While 
 
 
 92. BOWETT, supra note 11, at 98–99. 
 93. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 122, 94 (June 27) 
(separate opinion of President Singh). 
 94. Zedalis, supra note 33, at 238; Doc. 885, I/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs 400 (1945). 
 95. See U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1941st mtg. at 11–14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1941 (July 12, 1976); 
Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under International Law, 84 
AM. J. INT‘L L. 496 (1990). 
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there has been no resolution speaking to the legality of the doctrine, the 
debate at the U.N. Security Council has been divided.  
The need for separating different legal bases from each other and for 
separating legal from non-legal justifications for an intervening state 
entering another state‘s territory to protect its nationals is required and at 
times difficult. Similarly, states‘ views of the practice, particularly 
condemnations of specific incidents, do not necessarily clearly condemn 
the existence of the doctrine of protection of nationals itself, but rather its 
application in any given case. 
Attempts to firmly establish the doctrine of protection in treaty law 
have not been successful. The International Law Commission undertook a 
review of the subject of diplomatic protection.
96
 Special Rapporteur J.R. 
Dugard submitted his First Report on Diplomatic Protection on March 7, 
2000 (―Dugard Report‖).97 This was a review of the history and scope of 
diplomatic protection, coupled with recommendations about how the right 
of diplomatic protection could be employed consistent with the objectives 
of advancing ―the protection of human rights in accordance with the 
values of the contemporary legal order.‖98 Ancillary to this purpose, 
Dugard considered the protection of foreign nationals abroad, and his 
report proposed the use of force as an acceptable means of diplomatic 
protection for the purpose of the ―rescue of nationals.‖99 The draft article 
he proposed modified the Waldock criteria.
100
 Dugard specifically 
reviewed the history and controversy surrounding the doctrine of 
protection of nationals. He noted that his predecessors in the role of 
Special Rapporteur had taken a contrary view in that the use of force 
 
 
 96. Rep. of the Int‘l Law Comm‘n, 48th Sess., May 6–July 26, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/51/10; 
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996). 
 97. Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, Int‘l 
Law Comm‘n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/506 (Mar. 7, 2000) (by John R. Dugard) [hereinafter Dugard 
Report]. 
 98. Id. at 4. 
 99. Id. at 16–17. Draft Article 2 states: 
The threat or use of force is prohibited as a means of diplomatic protection, except in the 
case of the rescue of nationals where: 
(a) The protecting State has failed to secure the safety of its nationals by peaceful means; 
(b) The injuring State is unwilling or unable to secure the safety of the nationals of the 
protecting State; 
(c) The nationals of the protecting State are exposed to immediate danger to their persons; 
(d) The use of force is proportionate in the circumstances of the situation; 
(e) The use of force is terminated, and the protecting State withdraws its forces, as soon as 
the nationals are rescued.  
Id. 
 100. Waldock, supra note 5. 
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under the rubric of diplomatic protection should be specifically 
prohibited.
101
 He placed this right within the inherent right to self-defense 
preserved from customary law and rejected the premise that it can be 
justified as an exception to Article 2(4).
102
  
Tellingly, he implied that state practice since 1945 in support of 
military intervention to protect nationals abroad (in particular the ―failure 
of courts and political organs of the United Nations to condemn such 
action‖) indicated its acceptance.103 In the period since the adoption of the 
U.N. Charter, there has been no treaty, no U.N. Security Council 
Resolution, nor any judgment from the ICJ condoning or condemning the 
legality of protection of nationals abroad.
104
 As a result, statements on the 
legality of the doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad are supported 
by references to speeches at the U.N. Security Council in limited 
occasions where the doctrine was invoked, and with reference to U.N. 
General Assembly votes in response to these situations.
105
  
Furthermore, justifications for what appears to be forcible intervention 
to protect nationals abroad are not always provided, nor are the incidents 
necessarily subject to Security Council debate, let alone resolution or ICJ 
consideration. This is particularly evident, as discussed later, in more 
recent situations of NEO. Dugard infers from this that states condone the 
doctrine.
106
 
Gray, specifically referencing the U.S. interventions in Grenada and 
Panama, writes that the response of states, notably in the U.N. General 
Assembly, to various interventions shows a deep division between states, 
with few states according a right to protect nationals.
107
 Indeed, only two 
delegates, Igor Lukashuk and Robert Rosenstock, to the International Law 
Commission supported the draft articles in the Dugard report, and many 
―strongly denounced the proposal.‖108 However, it is suggested that 
 
 
 101. Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, Preliminary Report on Diplomatic Protection, 
Int‘l Law Comm‘n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/484, ¶ 11 (Feb. 4, 1998) (by Mohamed Bennouna). 
 102. Dugard Report, supra note 97, at 20. 
 103. Id. at 21. 
 104. The ICJ limited its comments on the failed U.S. attempt to rescue the U.S. nationals being 
held hostage in Tehran, noting that it was not required to ―settle the legality of the [rescue mission] 
under the Charter of the United Nations and under international law‖; however, they noted that the 
United States may have had ―understandable feelings of frustration.‖ United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 64, ¶ 93–94 (May 24). The Court did criticize the 
United States on the basis that the operation would ―undermine respect for the judicial process in 
international relations.‖ Id. ¶ 93. 
 105. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 106. Dugard Report, supra note 97, at 21. 
 107. GRAY, supra note 12, at 127. 
 108. Ruys, supra note 3, at 257. 
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caution must be taken in ascribing custom to state practice founded upon 
speeches in the General Assembly for matters of jus ad bellum.
109
 General 
Assembly member states have effectively delegated primary responsibility 
to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.
110
  
During the Cold War there were notable examples of the application of 
the doctrine, specifically by states who asserted it as justification for their 
actions. Examples since the adoption of the Charter include the United 
Kingdom in the Suez in 1956,
111
 the United States in Lebanon in 1958,
112
 
Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989,
113
 Belgium in Congo in 1960,
114
 
and again in 1964, with the United States
115
 and Israel as described 
previously.
116
 
The British justification for their joint intervention with France and 
Israel in Egypt is perhaps the first clear and detailed reliance on the 
doctrine of the protection of nationals after the U.N. Charter. The defense 
of the Suez Canal was a British responsibility; in July of 1956 Egyptian 
President Nasser nationalized the Canal.
117
 There were negotiations with 
Egypt, whose objective was to restore international control over the 
Canal, but these were unsuccessful.
118
 Contemporaneously, the United 
Kingdom and France were clandestinely discussing the possibility of 
Israeli involvement in a military action to recover the control of the Canal 
from Egypt.
119
 Israel was supportive, owing to its pre-existing tensions 
with Egypt that had resulted in a number of military incidents between the 
two countries.
120
 Accordingly, on October 31 of the same year, British and 
 
 
 109. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 9 (2d ed. 2004).  
 110. U.N. Charter art. 24. 
 111. U.N. SCOR, 11th Sess., 749th mtg. at 24, U.N. Doc. S/PV.749 (Oct. 30, 1956). 
 112. 39 DEP‘T ST. BULL. 181 (1958), available at http://archive.org/stream/departmentofstat 
391958unit# page/180/mode/2up. President Eisenhower announced the deployment of a contingent of 
U.S. military to ―protect American lives‖ as a part of the justification. 
 113. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, asserted a number of 
justifications for the U.S. action in Grenada, noting that there was an invitation from the Organization 
of Eastern Caribbean States, and a ―danger to innocent U.S. nationals.‖ U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., 
2491th mtg. ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2491 (Oct. 27, 1983). For justification for the intervention in 
Panama, see George Bush Presidential Library and Museum (Dec. 20, 1989), http://bushlibrary 
.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1356&year=1989&month=12. 
 114. U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 877th mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.877 (July 20, 1960). 
 115. See, e.g., Ruys, supra note 3, at 257; GRAY, supra note 12; Lillich, supra note 25. 
 116. U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1939th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1939 (July 9, 1976). 
 117. GILBERT, supra note 52, at 312. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Gilbert recounts that Israeli forces had come into contact with Egyptian forces since 1948 in 
the period surrounding the state of Israel. Id. at 233. The Egyptian Army ―lay astride the road leading 
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French forces launched Operation Musketeer to wrest control of the Canal 
back from Egypt.
121
  
In discussions at the Security Council, in addition to arguing that it 
was concerned with maintaining the freedom of navigation of the canal, 
the United Kingdom stated that ―British and French lives must be 
safeguarded. . . . [W]e should certainly not want to keep any forces in the 
area for one moment longer than is necessary to protect our nationals.‖122 
This line of argument was expanded upon by Prime Minister Eden and the 
Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons where they relied upon 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, as well as by the Lord Chancellor in the 
House of Lords.
123
 The British reliance on the doctrine was heavily 
criticized, especially that country‘s assertion that the lives of their 
nationals were in imminent risk.
124
  
In 1960, Belgium intervened in Congo to rescue a number of its 
nationals in the violent aftermath of that state‘s independence.125 In an 
address to the State Senate, the Belgian Prime Minister justified the 
sending of paratroopers into Congo to ―protéger la vie de ses 
ressortissants.‖126 This position was confirmed at a subsequent U.N. 
Security Council meeting.
127
 Reaction to Belgium‘s move was mixed and 
included the Soviet Union condemning Belgium;
128
 however, a 
subsequent draft resolution was voted against by the United States, Italy, 
France, the United Kingdom, and Argentina. The latter state advised that 
the protection of individuals is a ―sacred duty to which all other 
considerations must yield.‖129  
The Israeli intervention at Entebbe was justified primarily on the basis 
of self-defense of nationals in accordance with Article 51.
130
 There were 
two resolutions proposed to the U.N. Security Council, one condemning 
Israel and deeming its actions in contravention of international law and 
 
 
into [Israeli] settlements in the Negev.‖ Id. at 221. As recently as April of 1956, artillery fire launched 
from Egyptian positions in Gaza landed on Israeli settlements in Negev. Id. at 311.  
 121. GILBERT, supra note 52, at 312–28. 
 122. NATALINO RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION AND 
INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 28 (1985). 
 123. Id. at 29. 
 124. Ruys, supra note 3, at 239.  
 125. RONZITTI, supra note 122, at 30. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 31–32. 
 129. Id.  
 130. U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1939th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1939 (July 9, 1976). 
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the other condemning the hijacking (although it was silent on the question 
of legality). Neither was adopted.
131
 
The anti-hijacking resolution received votes from France, Italy, Japan, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom; the United States, Panama, and 
Romania abstained; the remaining seven members, including China and 
the Soviet Union, did not take part in the vote.
132
  
States‘ response to this action and the resulting interpretation of the 
legality of the doctrine has been described in a variety of ways. Zedalis 
characterized those who voted in favor of the resolution as implicitly 
accepting Israel‘s actions as lawful, while judging the U.N. practice as a 
whole as inconclusive in relation to the doctrine of the protection of 
nationals.
133
 His observation underlines the risk in evaluating speeches to 
the Security Council related to this incident as determinative of the view 
of states as to the existence of the doctrine of protection of nationals as a 
right of self-defense. While Israel asserted self-defense as a basis for its 
actions and the United States endorsed both the legal basis and the 
application to the circumstances, the positions of other nations were not as 
clear.  
While there were states who condemned the Israeli intervention and 
deemed it a violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, this did not 
challenge the principle that the right to protect nationals in foreign states 
existed within the right of self-defense.
134
 Certainly it is possible to infer 
states‘ rejection of the doctrine from certain comments. For example, 
Tanzania did not think that the Israeli action was conducted ―for the 
purpose of self-defence,‖ but was silent on whether the Ugandan 
authorities were complicit with the hostage takers.
135
 More representative 
were the comments of Pakistan, which characterized the Israeli action as 
―aggression‖ but challenged the Israeli conduct rather than the underlying 
doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad.
136
 A plausible conclusion, 
upon close review of the criticism of the Pakistani ambassador, is that the 
condemnation of Israel was conditioned upon Israel‘s failure to 
 
 
 131. Zedalis, supra note 33, at 247. 
 132. Green, supra note 8, at 317. 
 133. Zedalis, supra note 33, at 247–48. 
 134. See U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1939th mtg.-1943d mtg., U.N. Doc. Sp/PV.1939-1943 (July 9, 
1976). 
 135. U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1941st mtg. at 11–14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1941 (July 12, 1976). 
 136. Id. A similar assessment of the U.N. debate was made by Canada‘s Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT] in official correspondence compiled by the Legal Advisor to 
DFAIT Allan Kessel. Allan Kessel, Canadian Practice in International Law, 45 CAN. Y.B. INT‘L L. 
413 (2009) (―[The] debate—long on expressions of concern, but short on outright questioning of the 
right of states to protect citizens abroad, including through use of force.‖). 
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demonstrate that it complied with the requirements it put forward as being 
part of a lawful right of rescue, which as a result meant that their action 
was an unlawful use of force.
137
  
Ruys suggests that only the United States explicitly supported Israel‘s 
legal arguments and a ―broad majority of states denounced the operation 
as a violation of international law.‖138 Irrespective of criticisms of Israel‘s 
conduct, this denunciation is not necessarily a condemnation of the right 
of self-defense extending to the protection of nationals abroad, but rather 
the condemnation of the application of the right in these circumstances.  
In 1978, Egyptian commandos landed at Larnaca in Cyprus where a 
number of delegates of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, 
including Egyptians, were being held hostage in an airplane by a 
Palestinian dissident movement.
139
 In the midst of negotiations between 
the Cypriots and the captors, the Egyptians assaulted the aircraft, and in 
the course of doing so, were engaged by the Cypriot National Guard.
140
 A 
number of Egyptian commandos were killed, the hostage takers were 
arrested, and the hostages were freed.
141
 While not specifically raising the 
protection of nationals doctrine, Egypt maintained that it had acted 
lawfully.
142
 It was not raised at the U.N. Security Council. 
Two military interventions by the United States into Central America 
in the 1980s that relied upon the doctrine of the protection of nationals 
ignited a significant number of comments on the doctrine from 
academics.
143
 The U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983 was justified on 
several grounds in early communications from the Department of State, 
including its right under customary international law to protect its 
nationals. There were a number of other justifications advanced as well, 
 
 
 137. Id. at 15, ¶¶ 127, 132. 
 138. Ruys, supra note 3, at 249. 
 139. Terrorists: Murder and Massacre on Cyprus, TIME MAGAZINE (Mar. 6, 1978), http://www. 
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,915969-1,00.html.  
 140. RONZITTI, supra note 122, at 41. 
 141. Id. at 40–41. 
 142. Ruys, supra note 3, at 251. 
 143. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, In Defence of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 113, 118 (1986); Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under 
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT‘L L. 494, 496 (1990); Rex J. Zedalis, Protection of Nationals 
Abroad: Is Consent the Basis of Legal Obligation?, 25 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 209, 218 (1990); Ruth 
Wedgwood, The Use of Armed Force in International Affairs: Self-defense and Panama Invasion, 29 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 609 (1991); Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International 
Law: A Gross Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 293 (1991). For a legal defense of U.S. 
conduct in Panama from former Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State see Abraham D. 
Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 281–92 
(1991).  
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including invitation or consent.
144
 Similarly, President Bush ordered the 
1989 U.S. intervention in Panama to ―protect the lives of American 
citizens in Panama.‖145 
In both cases, the United States was criticized for its actions.
146
 
However, much of this criticism was arguably directed at the validity of 
the application of the doctrine rather than its existence; typical was the 
view that the U.S. invocation of the protection of nationals as the basis for 
its intervention was inaccurate because it did not adhere strictly to the 
doctrine‘s requirements.147 In the case of Grenada, it was not clear 
whether in fact there was valid invitation, as the invitation came from that 
state‘s Governor General, a largely ceremonial post.148 The General 
Assembly condemned the U.S. intervention into Grenada for violating 
―international law and the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of that state.‖149 It also condemned the U.S. intervention in 
Panama; however, these condemnations were not necessarily repudiations 
of the doctrine because the U.S. interventions were merely protecting their 
nationals and resulted in a prolonged presence in those states.
150
 
Furthermore, these condemnations were not ―overwhelming.‖151 
As to whether or not an attack on nationals abroad constitutes an 
―armed attack‖ under Article 51 (thus allowing the maligned state to 
 
 
 144. Oscar Schachter, In Defence of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
113, 118 (1986). 
 145. See George Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in 
Panama, Presidential Library and Museum (Dec. 20, 1989), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/ 
public_papers.php?id=1356&year=1989&month=12. 
 146. In the case of Grenada, see G.A. Res. 38/7, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/38/7, at 19–20 (Nov. 3, 1983). In regards to U.S. intervention in Panama, see G.A. Res. 
44/240, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/240 (Dec. 29, 1989). 
 147. Typical of the critiques leveled against the U.S. reliance on the doctrine of the protection of 
nationals in the case of Panama can be seen in statements like those made by Ved P. Nanda, who 
stated that ―notwithstanding the lack of agreement on the proper interpretation of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, while rescue operations of one‘s nationals might be considered permissible, the U.S. invasion 
of Panama does not satisfy the minimum required standards.‖ Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United 
States Intervention in Panama Under International Law, 84 AM. J. INT‘L L. 494, 496 (1990). 
Similarly, Farer wrote,  
rescue missions cannot be persuasively indicted as violations of international law, as long as 
they comply with the principles of proportionality and necessity and are not tainted by 
ulterior motives. The normative problem with Bush‘s Panamanian end game is precisely his 
difficulty in demonstrating compliance with the limiting conditions for lawful rescue. 
Farer, supra note 9, at 505–06. 
 148. GRAY, supra note 12, at 77. 
 149. G.A. Res. 38/7, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, U.N. Doc. A/Res/38/7, at 19–20 
(Nov. 3, 1983). The General Assembly did not cite the specific article violated. See id. 
 150. RUYS, supra note 27, at 223. 
 151. GRAY, supra note 12, at 128. 
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respond), there is no conclusive answer from state practice. When there is 
discussion of the doctrine of protection of nationals at the United Nations, 
it is generally not about the content or the mechanics of the doctrine, nor 
about its theoretical legality.
152
 The discussion is about the application of 
doctrine in a specific instances or circumstances. In debates at the U.N. 
Security Council, support or condemnation of the doctrine of protection of 
nationals is generally cloaked in terms of approval or disapprobation of 
the actions of the intervening state.
153
  
As noted earlier, the link between subjects and sovereigns in antiquity 
would seem to justify the proposition that an insult to one is an insult to 
the other. If such a link exists, one writer suggested that:  
[p]eople being a necessary condition for the existence of a state, the 
protection of nationals can be assimilated without great strain to the 
right of self-defense explicitly conceded in the text of the 
Charter.
154
 
 
This raises the question of whether a state can use force in self-defense to 
protect its nationals abroad in response to an armed attack in accordance 
with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. As Tom Ruys queried, ―[C]an an 
attack against nationals abroad be equated with an attack on the state 
itself?‖155 The definition of ―aggression,‖ which was the subject of a 
resolution in the General Assembly, does not include attacks against 
nationals abroad as an act of aggression.
156
 However, it notes that the list 
is not exhaustive.
157
 It is suggested that the question of whether or not 
such an attack includes or excludes a state‘s citizens abroad is not 
answered.
158
  
5. State Practice from the U.N. General Assembly 
While it has been noted that the U.N. General Assembly has passed 
resolutions condemning some instances where the doctrine has been 
invoked by states,
159
 it is suggested that they should not be viewed as 
 
 
 152. RONZITTI, supra note 122 with S/PV.1941. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Farer, supra note 9, at 505. 
 155. RUYS, supra note 27, at 214.  
 156. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, art. 3, U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 157. U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th mtg. at Annex art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).  
 158. RUYS, supra note 27, at 216 (―[T]he Charter provisions neither authorize nor definitively 
rule out protection of nationals per se.‖).  
 159. See discussion supra note 146. 
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persuasive evidence of state practice for a number of reasons. As 
discussed previously, there are valid concerns in discerning state practice 
from the stated positions of members of the General Assembly on matters 
of peace and security given the United Nations‘ very limited jurisdiction 
in those areas. An additional cautionary note with the weight given to 
General Assembly positions on matters of jus ad bellum relates to the 
context in which the position is provided. Gray writes: 
[T]here are problems in assessing the question how far what states 
say in these debates is significant. They may change their views; 
clearly their views at any particular time are influenced by disputes 
in which they are directly involved or in which they are interested. 
Typically states may attack each other and set out their own 
justifications for force during the general debates . . . it is important 
to see the statements in the context of the time in which they were 
made. Views expressed in debates on the adoption of declarations 
may be modified later in response to particular conflicts.
160
  
It has been suggested that limited weight should therefore be attributed to 
positions of General Assembly members. On the one hand, there are a 
group of states, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Belgium, Israel, and Egypt who have relied (albeit sometimes vaguely) on 
some formulation of this doctrine.
161
 Similarly, there are a number of 
states, including the Soviet Union, the former Eastern Bloc states, as well 
as some developing nations, that have consistently criticized episodes 
where states have invoked the doctrine but not necessarily the existence of 
the right of protection of nationals as a component of self-defense in some 
cases.
162
 
6. State Practice Post Cold War: The Rising Prominence of NEO  
Throughout the 1990s and during the last decade there have been a 
number of situations where states have deployed their forces to assist in 
the removal of nationals from states where there was unrest.
163
 In contrast 
 
 
 160. GRAY, supra note 12, at 9. 
 161. See generally NATALINO RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY 
COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 63 (1985). For the United States, see 
supra notes 113, 114; the United Kingdom, see supra note 112; France, see supra note 23; Belgium, 
see supra notes 23, 43; Israel, see supra note 52; and Egypt, see supra note 143. 
 162. Krylov, supra note 31, at 379. 
 163. See generally Richard B. Lillich, Lillich, supra note 25, at 105, 107, 243; see also Canada in 
Lebanon, supra note 2. 
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to the episodes discussed earlier, these instances did not result in 
discussion at the Security Council.
164
 Generally, these instances of 
intervention accompanied consent of the state where the intervention 
occurred; however, the validity of this consent may be questionable given 
the state of unrest.
165
 Nonetheless, there was no protest from the target 
state nor was there a report of the act of self-defense by the state using 
force to the Security Council as required by the U.N. Charter. A typical 
example is the U.S. intervention in Liberia in 1990.
166
 Similarly, there was 
no clear indication that positive consent was given by the target state.
167
 
III. NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (―NEO‖) 
The increasing frequency of situations where foreign militaries have 
deployed, with arguable or even no consent of the receiving state in order 
to remove their nationals, has given rise to a distinct type of military 
operation. These situations have been labeled Non-combatant Evacuation 
Operations, commonly known as NEOs, by most notable practitioners of 
the doctrine—namely, the United Kingdom and the United States.168 
While the term ―non-combatant evacuation operation‖ has been around 
for some time,
169
 its wider acceptance as a formal national doctrine is 
more recent. It was noted in the United Kingdom that in the three years 
since the establishment of its Permanent Joint Headquarters (―PJHQ‖) in 
1994, it conducted eleven NEOs, including five in Sierra Leone, and 
―[g]iven the relative high frequency of NEOs and the absence of any 
endorsed doctrine, PJHQ produced the [first official planning guidance] in 
early 1998 with the aim of providing guidance for the planning and 
execution of a NEO.‖170 
A state‘s military doctrine draws on a number of sources; however, its 
authority originates from the state. In Canada, for example, military 
 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 159 (3d ed. 2008) writes 
that ―many of these cases occurred when there was no effective government.‖ Id.  
 166. GRAY, supra note 12, at 129. For a review of the situation in Liberia, see Lillich, supra note 
25, at 243.  
 167. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 159 (3d ed. 2008) writes 
that ―it seems that third states were willing to acquiesce in the forcible evacuation of nationals.‖ Id.  
 168. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, Joint Warfare Publication 3–51 (2000); CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT 
CHIEFS OF STAFF, Joint Pub 3-07.5, at vii (1997). 
 169. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY, NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION, AR 525–12 (1973). 
 170. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 3–51, iii (2000), available at http:// 
www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/D0302742-2103-4C9D-9CE8-D6F2E6B1860F/0/20071218_jwp3_51_U_ 
DCDCIMAPPS.pdf. 
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doctrine at a national level is approved by the Chief of Defence Staff, 
who, ―[u]nless the Governor in Council otherwise directs,‖ is responsible 
for ―all orders and instructions to the Canadian Forces that are required to 
give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the 
Government of Canada or the Minister.‖171  
In 2003, Canada issued the Joint Doctrine Manual Non-Combatant 
Evacuation Operations.
172
 The preface states that the ―Government of 
Canada bears a fundamental responsibility for the safety and well being of 
all Canadians.‖173 It acknowledges that abroad this responsibility is 
assumed by Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(―DFAIT‖);174 however, it then recognizes that due to the ―uncertainties 
under which evacuations are normally conducted,‖ assistance may be 
required from the Canadian Forces.
175
 In ―extreme circumstances,‖ the 
Canadian Forces may be required to assume full responsibility for the 
evacuation.
176
  
The Canadian doctrine for NEOs is similar to that of the United States 
and the United Kingdom. The U.S. publication Joint Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations notes that such 
operations are conducted to ―assist the Department of State.‖177 The 
British document Non-combatant Evacuation Operations, was 
promulgated by the Chiefs of Staff of the British Armed Forces in 
2000.
178
 It states: ―[Her Majesty‘s Government] discharges responsibility 
for the protection of British citizens overseas through the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office . . . assisted by the Ministry of Defence . . . as 
required.‖179 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (―NATO‖) recognizes a NEO 
as a military operation other than war, which it deems a small scale 
contingency operation conducted nationally, bilaterally or 
multinationally.
180
 The description given a NEO by these states is similar. 
 
 
 171. National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5, ss.18(2).  
 172. DEP‘T OF NAT‘L DEFENCE, supra note 6.  
 173. Cdn Manual (i). 
 174. An Act respecting the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, R.S.C., 1985, 
c. E-22 at s.2, available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/E-22.pdf. 
 175. Cdn Manual (i). 
 176. DEP‘T OF NAT‘L DEFENCE, supra, note 6, at i. 
 177. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Joint Pub 3-07.5, at vii (1997); see also Exec. 
Order No. 12656, s.1301(2)(f) (1988), charging the Department of State with ―[p]rotection or 
evacuation of United States citizens and nationals abroad and safeguarding their property abroad, in 
consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Health and Human Services.‖ 
 178. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 170. 
 179. Id. 
 180. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) & Research and Technology Organization 
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Canada deems it a ―military operation conducted to assist Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT] in evacuating Canadians 
and selected non-Canadians from threatening circumstances in a foreign 
[host nation] and moving them to a safe haven.‖181 
For the United Kingdom, it is an ―operation conducted to relocate 
designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of 
safety.‖182 The U.S. doctrine holds that NEOs are performed to evacuate 
―non-combatants, nonessential military personnel, selected host-nation 
citizens, and third country nationals whose lives are in danger from 
locations in a host foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven and/or the 
United States.‖183 Regarding the nature of the operation in Canada as 
―fundamentally defensive in nature,‖184 in the United Kingdom it is a 
―limited intervention operation‖185 and in the United States, it usually 
involves ―swift insertions of force, temporary occupation of an objective, 
and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission.‖186 The 
doctrine classifies the threat environment for the conduct of the operation 
in a foreign state as permissive, uncertain or hostile.
187
  
The degree of explicit legal justification for these operations varies. 
While they all acknowledge consent of the host nation as one basis, the 
United Kingdom explicitly states that it ―may be justified on grounds of 
self-defence (Article 51 of the UN Charter).‖188 The Australian doctrine 
includes the ―inherent right of self-defence to protect its nationals.‖189 The 
Canadian document, in contrast, states that the ―legal status of the NEO 
and the [Task Force] conducting it must be established prior to entry‖ in 
the host nation, however, however it is silent on the legal basis for hostile 
NEOs.
190
 It cites criteria for Canadian Forces involvement as ―the 
agreement of the recognized host nation authorities (with some significant 
exceptions).‖191 It is suggested that this doctrine implies that a hostile 
NEO could have a legal basis other than consent. This inference is 
 
 
(RTO), Handbook on the Analysis of Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations in Long Term Defence 
Planning (Feb. 2005), available at http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFullText/RTO/TR/RTO-TR-SAS-
027///TR-SAS-027-$$ALL.pdf. 
 181. DEP‘T OF NAT‘L DEFENCE, supra note 6, at GL-3. 
 182. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 170, at 1–1. 
 183. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Joint Pub 3-07.5, supra note 177, at vii. 
 184. DEP‘T OF NAT‘L DEFENCE, supra note 6, at 1-1. 
 185. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 170, at 1-1. 
 186. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Joint Pub 3-07.5, supra note 177, at vii. 
 187. Id. at 1-2–1-3; GILBERT, supra note 52, at 1–1; RONZITTI, supra note 125, at I-3–I-4. 
 188. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 170, at 4A-1. 
 189. ADDP 3.10, n.194, ch. 5, Annex B, Legal Considerations; Ruys, supra note 3, at 17. 
 190. DEP‘T OF NAT‘L DEFENCE, supra note 6, at 2B-6.   
 191. Id. at 4-3. 
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buttressed by record of Canadian Practice in International Law compiled 
by the Legal Advisor to DFAIT on the subject of the ―Protection of 
Nationals Abroad.‖192 He states that the right to use force in these 
circumstances stems from the inherent right of self-defense.
193
 The U.S. 
doctrine does not specify the legal basis for entry into host nations where 
there is no consent or United Nations Security Council resolutions.  
The United States acknowledged that Operation Sharp Edge, carried 
out from June 1990 to January 1991, was an NEO.
194
 It was launched to 
rescue U.S. and other foreign nationals threatened by the Liberian civil 
war between factions loyal to President Samuel Doe and rebel leader 
Prince Johnson.
195
 It was accomplished without seeking or receiving 
express permission from either of the Liberian leaders.
196
 This led one 
writer to conclude that the ―international community, now more than ever 
in the post-Cold War period, is prepared to accept, endorse, or, at the very 
least, tolerate the forcible protection of nationals abroad in appropriate 
cases.‖197 
France was involved in evacuation operations in the Central African 
Republic in 1996 and 2003, in Gabon in 1990 and 2007, in Rwanda in 
1990 to 1994, in the Ivory Coast in 2002 to 2003 and jointly with Belgium 
in Zaire in 1991 and 1993.
198
  
In addition, there were a number of nations that evacuated their 
nationals from Lebanon during the Israeli-Hizbollah armed conflict in 
2006.
199
 It is not clear that the Canadian effort was classified as a NEO, 
 
 
 192. Allan Kessel, in the Canadian Practice in International Law, XLVII CANADIAN YEARBOOK 
OF INT‘L LAW 411–47 (2009). 
 193. Kessel states: 
The right of states to use force in the protection of nationals abroad flows from the 
universally accepted principle of international law that injury to a state‘s national may be 
considered injury to the State itself; as such it is properly accommodated within the inherent 
right to self-defense including as exercised against non-state actors. The right arises in 
situations where nationals are at risk of death or grave injury, and the host (territorial) state is 
unwilling or unable to secure their safety, or otherwise take necessary action in compliance 
with its obligations under international law. 
Id. at 412. 
 194. Sherrod L. Bumgardner, A NEO is More than a Maneuver, MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY 
COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 5 (1992), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ 
library/report/1992/BSL.htm. 
 195. Id. Bumgardner notes that despite the intensity of the civil conflict, during the main 
evacuation effort over a few weeks there were no weapons fired by the U.S. Marines.  
 196. Lillich, supra note 25, at 243. 
 197. Id. at 244. 
 198. Ruys, supra note 3, at 251. Zaire is the former name of the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 199. The United States evacuated nearly 15,000 American citizens. GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, State Dep’t: The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens from 
Lebanon, June 7, 2007, available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-893R. The United 
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however, as it involved a Canadian military operation in Lebanese 
territory. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade stated 
that:  
[T]here is no higher priority or obligation for a nation. The safe 
return of Canadian citizens was our only motivation and goal from 
the beginning of this crisis . . . the work undertaken by officials in 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) and 
numerous other departments including . . . the Department of 
National Defence (DND) . . . Canadian officials in Lebanon and 
Israel and throughout the Middle East, as well as in Ottawa, were 
mobilized to react as effectively and efficiently as possible . . . . No 
one—not even the Lebanese government—foresaw the events and 
violence erupting so quickly or having such grave consequences for 
civilians as we have seen in the last three weeks.
200
 
In a number of situations, there has been limited information publicly 
available to confirm whether consent was given and whether there was an 
effective government capable of providing this consent.
201
 These recent 
cases have not received consideration at the U.N. Security Council 
because they have not been raised there.
202
 It has been observed that 
recent practice of states removing nationals from threatening 
circumstances abroad may mean that many states, perhaps even some of 
those who have protested past episodes of intervention to protect foreign 
nationals, have ―acquiesce[d] in the forcible evacuation of nationals.‖203  
Throughout the 1990s and in the past decade, a number of states have 
deployed their military forces to assist in the repatriation of their 
nationals. The NEO is well established in both doctrine and practice. 
 
 
Kingdom evacuated 4,600 people in the course of Operation Highbrow. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, The 
Historical Characteristics of Non-combatant Evacuation Operations, July 2011, available at 
https://www.dstl.gov.uk/downloads/04-05_ Sam_Dudin.pdf.  
 200. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International 
Development, 1st Session, 39th Parliament, Evidence of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Peter 
MacKay, at 2 (minutes 1020). http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=232 
3940&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1. 
 201. See Ruys, supra note 3, at 252. 
 202. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 159 (3d ed. 2008). 
 203. GRAY, supra note 12, at 129. 
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IV. THE RUSSIAN GEORGIAN CONFLICT—AUGUST 2008 
The doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad was asserted by 
representatives of the Russian Federation in the summer of 2008 amid the 
conflict with Georgia.
204
 The conflict arose against a backdrop of 
simmering tensions between the two states. This confrontation was the 
result of Russian support for semi-autonomous regions in Georgia and 
Georgia‘s increasingly western-oriented alignment and integration, 
notably the results of a national referendum in which voters gave approval 
to their government to seek NATO membership.
205
  
This view of Russia on the doctrine of protection of nationals is 
particularly significant since its predecessor, the Soviet Union, 
consistently condemned Western nations who purported to exercise the 
right to protect nationals abroad.
206
  
In 1960, the Soviet Union likened claims made by Belgium that it was 
protecting its nationals in Congo to discredited imperial power doctrine 
from the nineteenth century.
207
 At the U.N. Security Council it deemed the 
Israeli raid on Entebbe ―an act of direct, flagrant aggression and an 
outright violation of the Charter, especially Article 2, paragraph 4.‖208  
There is little evidence that Russia adopted the position of the Soviet 
Union on the doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad after the end of 
the Cold War and the dissolution of that state. In 1993, the enactment of 
the Russian Federation Constitution included a responsibility for the state 
to ―guarantee to its citizens protection and patronage abroad.‖209 As the 
U.N. Security Council met in response to the unfolding armed conflict in 
South Ossetia, Russian Ambassador Churkin stated: 
The President of the Russian Federation today unambiguously 
emphasized that Russia will not allow the deaths of our compatriots 
to go unpunished, and that the lives and dignity of our citizens, 
wherever they are, will be protected, in accordance with the 
 
 
 204. See supra notes 210, 211. 
 205. World: Countries and Territories: Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
news/international/countriesandterritories/georgia/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
 206. RONZITTI, supra note 122, at 63. 
 207. Id. at 60. 
 208. Id. at 39. 
 209. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 61(2) (Russ.), 
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). 
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Constitution of Russia and in accordance with the laws of the 
Russian Federation and international law.
210
 
Separately, he said that ―[t]he aim of that operation is to ensure that we 
protect Russian citizens who are in that region . . . . Force will be used 
only in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, in exercise of the right 
of self-defence by the Russian Federation.‖211 
In the course of U.N. Security Council speeches, only three states 
made reference to the legal justification advanced by Russia. Croatia 
expressed particular concern that statements ―can have far-reaching 
ramifications not limited to the present conflict.‖212 The United Kingdom 
suggested that the difference between Russian rhetoric at the Security 
Council and the comments and actions of Russian officials and military 
outside of it cast ―doubt on Russia‘s claims that their actions are 
humanitarian.‖213 Most compelling were the comments of the Panamanian 
representative Ambassador Arias, stating that Panama condemned ―the 
entirely disproportionate, and therefore illegitimate, use of force by the 
Russian Federation with the stated aim of protecting its citizens and 
peacekeeping forces.‖214 
This is interesting given the controversial application of the doctrine of 
protection of nationals to Panama in 1989 because it suggests that it is the 
application and not the right of protection of nationals abroad which they 
condemn.  
Russia maintained their position in a number of venues. In an opinion 
published in the Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Chief Justice Zorkin of the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the highest arbiter for the 
interpretation of the Russian Constitution, wrote approvingly of the 
Russian military engagement, declaring that the government was 
obligated to ―ensure compliance with article 61 of the Constitution, which 
in black and white record that Russia guarantees its citizens‘ protection 
and patronage outside its boundaries.‖215 
 
 
 210. U.N. SCOR, 63d Sess., 5922 mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5952 (Aug. 8, 2008). 
 211. U.N. SCOR, 63d Sess., 5953 mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5953 (Aug. 10, 2008).  
 212. U.N. Doc. S/PV.5952, supra note 210, at 6–7. 
 213. U.N. Doc. S/PV.5953, supra note 211, at 12. 
 214. Id. at 15.ee. 
 215. See Walking the Razor’s Edge, Peace Enforcement and Human Rights, ROSSIISKAIA 
GAZETA, http://www.rg.ru/2008/08/13/zorkin.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). For an analysis of the 
legalities of the campaign, see Peter Roudik, Russia: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia, THE LAW 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 2008-01474, at 9 (Sept. 2008), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/russian-georgia-
war.pdf. He notes that the Rossiiskaia Gazeta is the ―official government-owned daily newspaper.‖ Id.  
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In a speech to the Valdai International Discussion Club on September 
12, 2008, President Medvedev said: 
Of course we will defend our interests, but most important of all, 
we will protect our citizens. I have said this before and I want to 
emphasize it now. The world changed practically straight away 
following these events. It occurred to me that for Russia, August 8, 
2008 is almost like September 11, 2001, for the United States. A lot 
of people are making this comparison now. Someone here also 
made this comparison, I think. I think it is quite accurate, in 
application to the situation in Russia, at least.
216
 
Georgia made application to the ICJ on August 12, 2008 under the 1965 
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to 
establish Russian responsibility for its actions in Georgian territory.
217
 In a 
preliminary proceeding the Russian advocate submitted that: 
It was a massive, well-planned attack with the involvement of 
aviation and tanks, artillery and multiple launch rocket systems. It 
immediately resulted in numerous casualties among civilians and 
the Russian peacekeepers. This attack left the Respondent no other 
option than to use military force in self-defence. Russia‘s use of 
force prevented greater losses among the Russian peacekeepers, 
civilians, mass deaths among the non-Georgian population of South 
Ossetia or their eviction from the territory of South Ossetia.
218
 
The Russian representative did not expressly cite the doctrine of 
protection of nationals in oral arguments. Instead, he spoke in terms of 
preventing death among ―Russian peacekeepers, civilians, mass death 
among the non-Georgian population.‖219 In light of the fact that a number 
of the non-Georgian population held Russian passports,
220
 it is suggested 
that this reference may be interpreted as an assertion of protection of 
Russian citizens as a basis for their military intervention.  
 
 
 216. See Transcript of the Meeting with the Participants in the International Club Valdai, 
PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/09/12/1644_ 
type82912type82917type84779_206409.shtml. 
 217. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), 2008 I.C.J. 2, at 4, para. 12 (Sept. 8), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/140/14657.pdf. 
 218. Georgia v. Russian Federation CR 2008/23, VERBATIM RECORD (Sept. 8, 2008, 3:00 
PM), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/14713.pdf. 
 219. Id. at 12.  
 220. Roudik, supra note 215, at 10–11. 
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The position of Russia, as discerned from its constitution and the 
collective comments of its officials and representatives, is that the 
doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad exists as a right of self-
defense in international law. The response from the members of the 
Security Council to this justification, with the exception of Croatia, has 
not been condemnatory; rather it seems that there is acquiescence to the 
doctrine with criticism directed at the sincerity of Russian motives and the 
conduct of its armed forces. The legality was suspect by the 
disproportionate use of force, rather than the simple fact of it being 
exercised. It is acknowledged that this is not a strong endorsement of the 
doctrine; however, it seems that at this point the response of the U.N. 
Security Council states should be construed as a tacit acknowledgement of 
the existence of the doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad.  
The enduring criticism of the invocation of the doctrine since the 
enactment of the U.N. Charter has been that it is often a pretext for 
measures beyond the protection of nationals, rather than for ends which 
are achieved by means disproportionate to those required to merely 
protect nationals. By this interpretation, it would seem that Russia 
leveraged acceptance of the doctrine of the protection of self-defense for 
the justification of a use of force that was disproportionate and contrary to 
the third Waldock criterion and not strictly confined to the object of 
protecting its citizens against injury.  
V. THE DOCTRINE OF THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS: TOWARDS A 
RIGHT OF REMOVAL 
A framework for the doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad is 
emerging from the fusion of NEO and their corresponding acceptance by 
states. This has been recognized by a number of writers, although there 
are still debates on the boundaries of this doctrine. Tom Ruys suggests 
that ―de lege ferenda, a way out of this impasse may begin with the 
identification of a number of agreed ‗baselines‘ and the acceptance that 
‗protection of nationals abroad‘ is not a ‗one size fits all doctrine.‘‖221 
Ruys observes that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter cannot be used to 
justify a prolonged stay in a foreign state, and that the doctrine does not 
cover the protection of property.
222
 He then cited the draft International 
 
 
 221. Ruys, supra note 3, at 16. 
 222. Id. at 264. 
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Law Commission articles on diplomatic protection for the proposition that 
diplomatic protection is limited to peaceful means of protection.
223
  
He then notes the increasing prevalence of evacuation operations 
which have not occasioned protest, and he concludes that the NEO 
operations provide a basis for a ―special right of self-defence enshrined in 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.‖224 He suggests it would arise in those 
situations where there is a breakdown of law and order or a collapse in 
government.
225
 This could include non-consent evacuation where lethal 
force may be authorized. It would exclude hostage rescue missions, which 
he suggests are typified by the Entebbe Raid and the Egyptian raid in 
Lanarca.
226
 
While the framework he provides is for the most part well reasoned, it 
is suggested that distinction between acceptable evacuation rescues and 
non-acceptable hostage rescue missions is problematic. If international 
law allows for an evacuation operation, then it is suggested a properly 
applied test for the exercise of the right to protect nationals abroad would 
permit the rescue of hostages as well. 
A. The Waldock Criteria and the NEO Limits of Protection 
Ruys distinguishes between evacuation operations and hostage rescue 
operations.
227
 The difference between a NEO where there is no host nation 
consent and where it may be justifiable to use lethal force, according to 
Ruys ―especially, but not exclusively, when nationals are attacked because 
of political antagonism to their government,‖228 and a situation where 
hostages are rescued is not fundamental insofar as the application of the 
protection of nationals doctrine. 
The second strand of the Waldock test requires that prior to an exercise 
of a right of self defense to protect nationals is a ―failure or inability on 
the part of a territorial sovereign to protect them.‖229 This requirement is 
formulated in the legal justification for a NEO in the British doctrine as 
when a state is ―unable or unwilling to protect.‖230 It would seem that 
Ruys distinguishes between instances where there is a failure and 
 
 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 268. 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. at 270. 
 227. Id. at 269–70. 
 228. Id. at 17. 
 229. Waldock, supra note 5, at 467. 
 230. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 170, at 4A-2(b). 
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unwillingness to protect from those where there is an inability to protect. 
The latter gives rise to the right to protect; the former does not. 
The inability may be causally linked to the host government‘s collapse. 
Ruys states that the Israeli raid at Entebbe and the Egyptian raid at 
Larnaca would thus not be lawful applications of the doctrine of 
protection.
231
 Following his rationale, one would infer that he assessed a 
failure or unwillingness on the part of the Ugandan or Cypriot 
governments to act, as opposed to their inability to do so.
232
 He further 
suggests that the potential for injury, as shown at Larnaca, militates away 
from including hostage rescue in the right of protection.
233
 While a 
potential for injury is an appropriate consideration for a purposeful 
evaluation of the validity of a law that allows the use of force, it is 
suggested that such an evaluation should also consider the potential of 
injury to the hostages if they are not protected by their state.  
There are challenges with these distinctions. First, determining 
whether or not a government has collapsed, or whether it is capable of 
giving consent to an evacuation operation could be very controversial in 
its own right. As Bowett wrote in response to the concerns that 
recognition of a right of protection of nationals is open to abuse:  
[S]ince the exercise of the right depends upon the international 
legal system it must be capable of evaluation in the light of the 
standards imposed by that system. This is particularly so where the 
right to resort to these extreme forms of protection is dependent 
upon a prior breach of the standards of state responsibility imposed 
by the system. If the question of breach is capable of being 
objectively determined, then the reaction to that breach must 
equally be so. Any state invoking the right of self-defence must be 
 
 
 231. Ruys, supra note 3, at 270. 
 232. As seen in the U.N.S.C. debates arising out of the Israeli raid on Entebbe, the question of 
whether Uganda was collaborating with the hijackers was very contentious. See U.N. Doc. 
S.PV/1939-1943 generally for this discussion, a portion of which was found in the initial debate on 9 
July 1976, where Uganda‘s representative stated his government‘s position on this:  
I should like to make it clear that Uganda has never condoned and never will condone 
international piracy. It is not therefore true to say, as has been alleged by the ruling circles in 
Israel that Uganda collaborated with the hijackers. The Ugandan Government got involved in 
this affair accidentally and purely for humanitarian reasons. 
U.N. Doc. S.PV/1939, para.34. Israel‘s representative took a different view: ―The weight of evidence 
before us reveals ‗prior knowledge and active connivance on the part of the Government of Uganda in 
this whole episode.‖ Id. para. 90. 
 233. Ruys, supra note 3, at 270. 
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prepared to justify the measures it takes in pursuance of that right 
before an impartial tribunal.
234
 
Larnaca would have failed on the second prong of the test enunciated by 
Waldock. The evidence suggests that the Cypriot Government was able 
and willing to protect, and was in the process of negotiating the release of 
the hostages. Therefore this requirement is not met.
235
 The third criterion 
of the Waldock test requires that the measures of protection be strictly 
confined to protecting the nationals against injury. It is not clear that the 
Egyptian forces complied with this requirement when they left their 
aircraft at Larnaca. In contrast, there is little evidence of negotiations 
between the Ugandan government and the hostage takers at Entebbe. 
The requirement that the exercise of any right of self-defense be 
necessary and proportionate means that the scale of response to 
circumstances jeopardizing a state‘s nationals abroad must be 
commensurate with the nature and extent of the threat of injury to those 
nationals. This would make unlawful any ill-conceived expeditions to 
inflict injury on a state in reprisal for harm to the intervening state‘s 
nationals.  
Hostage rescue situations cause a conundrum for some writers who 
take the position that they are not comprised within the right of self-
defense. Attempts are made to reconcile the Israeli raid at Entebbe with a 
doubtful view of the doctrine of protection. Ruys suggested that it would 
be appropriate to have a ―waiver of illegality.‖236 Daudet writes that even 
in case of very serious actions, including hostage-taking, the ―rule of non-
intervention is paramount . . . regardless . . . of the feeling of frustration 
which can result from the obligation to refrain from using violence.‖237 
Nonetheless, he states that in instances such as Entebbe, the intervening 
state is usually ―exonerated, or at least its responsibility is diminished‖ on 
the basis of the Corfu Channel case, where the court noted that liability 
for the British intervention was attenuated by the Albanian failure to 
exercise its sovereign powers.
238
 
It is suggested that such approaches to hostage rescues are no more 
consonant with the objective of reconciling an unsettled area of the 
international law than the inclusion of hostage rescue within the doctrine 
 
 
 234. BOWETT, supra note 11, at 105. 
 235. See Terrorists, supra note 139, at 1. 
 236. Ruys, supra note 3, at 270.  
 237. Yves Daudet, The Limits of State Action, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 206 
(Higgins & Flory eds., 1997). 
 238. Id. at 207. 
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of protection of nationals abroad.
239
 It seems from the practice of states, 
particularly more recently from Security Council debate in the Russian 
Georgian conflict, that the right of protections of nationals exists at law, 
notwithstanding that it remains contentious in its application to real world 
events. In his first report Dugard explained the rationale for his attempt to 
codify the doctrine of protection: 
This seems to reflect State practice more accurately than an 
absolute prohibition on the use of force (which is impossible to 
reconcile with actual state practice) . . . From a policy perspective it 
is wiser to recognize the existence of such a right, but to prescribe 
severe limits, than to ignore its existence, which will permit States 
to invoke the traditional arguments in support of a broad right of 
intervention and lead to further abuse.
240
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The evolution of the doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad has 
been marked by the corresponding maturation of international law as it 
relates to the use of force throughout the twentieth century. The roots of 
the doctrines reach into antiquity and it has emerged true to its origins 
within the right of self-defense, refined and articulated by Waldock. In the 
modern era, signaled by the creation of the U.N. and the codification and 
restrictions on the use of force by states contained within its Charter, the 
doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad has, at times stubbornly, 
held fast. The doctrine has been used in the past by governments to justify 
some military incursions which did not satisfy the doctrine‘s criteria. A 
careful review of the response to these episodes suggests that much of the 
criticism is directed at the use of force itself, not the doctrine.  
The non-response of states and third parties to the instances of NEO 
has led a number of recent observers to conclude there is a level of state 
acquiescence to the practice.
241
 Certainly, many observers maintain that 
the doctrine of the protection of nationals abroad, including hostage 
rescue, is acceptable at law as an exercise of the right of self-defense.
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 239. Ruys, supra note 3, at 270, summarizes that ―the longstanding controversy over the legality 
of forcible protection of nationals remains unresolved.‖ Id. at 270. He finds this unsatisfactory and 
writes that it is preferable to refine the criteria by which the doctrine of the protection of nationals 
must be judged. Id. at 271. 
 240. Dugard report, supra note 97, at 59. 
 241. See GRAY, supra note 12, at 129; Ruys, supra note 3, at 18. 
 242. See Dinstein, supra note 11, at 234. See also the proposition that Entebbe ―is regarded as 
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The author suggests that NEO, through its application and broad 
acceptance in states‘ practice, has carefully circumscribed the right of a 
state to use force to protect nationals abroad. 
While many states condemned Russian actions in South Ossetia, the 
muted response to the legal principle underlying their justification 
suggests that the legal doctrine is less controversial and more established 
than before.  
It is suggested that the growing acceptance of NEO has contributed to 
this state. The military doctrine of a number of states and the application 
of that doctrine in the cases of NEO within states suggest that states 
believe that they are acting in accordance with international law. NEO 
have come to embody a broadly accepted state‘s practice; the application 
of a state‘s right to protect its nationals abroad. The doctrine of the 
protection of nationals has been invoked as a pretext for many different 
and expansive interventions into foreign states, which were clearly 
disproportionate to the use of force required to protect nationals. In 
situations where NEOs have been launched, the force used has been 
proportionate to the objective of protecting nationals abroad, through their 
removal from the receiving state. 
Sometimes, the intervening state has the receiving nation‘s consent to 
intervene. However, it is submitted that the legal basis in situations where 
there is no consent from the host nation, it is in the right of self-defense 
for the protection of nationals abroad in accordance with criteria laid 
down by Waldock. 
States which have launched NEO have in effect exercised the legal 
right of a state to protect its nationals. A NEO objective is to protect 
nationals, not to infringe upon the sovereignty of the state in which the 
nationals are facing a threat. As such, particularly after the more 
controversial invocations of the doctrine by the United States in Grenada 
and Panama, the acceptance of the doctrine of the protection of nationals 
has been shaped by the corresponding acceptance of the practice of NEO. 
This is particularly relevant to the third criterion of Waldock, the content 
 
 
having contributed decisively to a limited extension of the right of self-defence to include the 
protection of nationals abroad.‖ Michael Byers, Not Yet Havoc: Geopolitical Change and the 
International Rules on Military Force, 31 REV. OF INT‘L STUD. 51, 53 (2005). Then interestingly he 
implicitly fuses NEO within the protection of nationals legal doctrine: ―When civil strife elsewhere 
threatens a country‘s citizens, whether in Haiti, Liberia or Sierra Leone, sending soldiers to rescue 
them has become so commonplace that the issue of legality is rarely raised.‖ Id. at 53. In addition, 
there are a number of American authors who have concluded that this right exists, including 
Schachter, supra note 44, at 1629; Eichensehr, supra note 28, at 484; and Lillich, supra note 25, at 97 
(in his observation of international practice of states).  
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of the measures of protection. The protection involves removal of the 
foreign nationals, not the establishment of order out of chaos. The 
intervening state is not able to establish a non-consensual presence in the 
host state for any longer than is required to remove its citizens.
243
 It is 
appropriate to include the hostage rescue situations within the ambit of 
this doctrine.  
Finally, for the reasons of policy described by Dugard it is important to 
regulate uses of force within accepted bounds of international law. The 
intersection of the military doctrine of NEO with the legal doctrine of the 
protection of nationals abroad provides such an opportunity. Greater 
clarity in the use of force may contribute to greater influence on the 
conduct of states. Absent a clearly defined right of self–defense as 
described by Waldock, the doctrine of the protection of nationals is more 
susceptible to the abuse in application which has long been associated 
with it. 
 
 
 243. Schachter observed 
[I]t may be noted that in three of the other cases, Stanleyville, the Dominican Republic, and 
Grenada, questions were raised whether the interventions, though originally justified by 
necessity, became tainted with illegality through subsequent interference in the affairs of the 
territorial state . . . clearly, an action that may be legal in its inception could become illegal 
through prolonged intervention.  
Schachter, supra note 44, at 1630–31. 
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